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Preferences for Truthfulness: Heterogeneity Among and Within Individuals 
Rajna Gibson*, Carmen Tanner**, and Alexander F. Wagner*** 
April 10, 2012 
 
Forthcoming, American Economic Review 
Abstract 
We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic 
costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying.  The results allow us to reject a 
type-based model.  People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either 
"economic types" (who care only about consequences) or "ethical types" (who care only 
about process).  Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among 
individuals.  Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and 
their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness 
are also heterogeneous within individuals.  
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Standard economic models of self-interested utility maximization, which emphasize the 
role of consequences in determining agents’ actions, predict a grim inexorability to all 
economic systems.  These models are based on an assessment of humans as self-interested 
agents who behave dishonestly for cogent reasons.  These hypothetical persons prioritize 
the outcomes of their actions and only forgo materially beneficial lying if strategic or 
reputational considerations arise.  Some researchers, such as Amar Bhide and Howard H. 
Stevenson (1990), assert that these reputational forces are often weak, implying that 
honesty simply does not seem to pay.  
Examples of disastrous dishonesty based on such self-interest abound in the corporate 
world.  Deliberate deception has augmented the economic effects of regulatory failure, of a 
deteriorating macro-economy, and of inadequate models, in, for example, the subprime 
crisis.   
Yet, truthfulness also appears to prosper in society.  Whistleblowers often jeopardize 
their careers and friendships when they truthfully reveal the wrongdoing of their 
companies.  Some CEOs are regarded as particularly virtuous (Linda K. Treviño and 
Michael E. Brown 2004).  Numerous journalists risk their lives to report the truth about 
political repression, economic crimes, and human rights violations.   
To explain otherwise puzzling behavior both in the field and in experiments, several 
authors have proposed the idea that some people experience intrinsic costs when they lie.  
For example, in a cheap-talk sender-receiver game, Uri Gneezy (2005) found that many 
subjects told the truth.1  Of various possible explanations for this result, he inferred that the 
most plausible was that “people have non-consequential preferences in which they treat the 
same monetary outcome differently, depending on the process that leads up to it” (p. 392). 
Moreover, in Gneezy’s interpretation, “different people weigh these preferences 
differently” (ibid.). That is, a model in which agents exhibit (continuously) heterogeneous 
preferences for truthfulness could explain his data. 
Because Gneezy’s experiment was set in a strategic context, social preferences may 
also have been active.  Therefore, Gneezy also emphasized the joint relevance of process-
                                                 
1 Similar results on truth-telling have been obtained in other studies (John H. Evans, R. Lynn Hannan, Ranjani 
Krishnan, and Donald V. Moser 2001; Santiago Sánchez-Pagés and Marc Vorsatz 2007).  Only a few 
researchers, such as Stanley Baiman and Barry L. Lewis (1989), have found that people will lie even for just a 
tiny monetary payoff.  See the edited volume by Paul J. Zak (2008) for numerous additional examples. 
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dependent preferences and of consequences to oneself and to others.2  But it is precisely 
because both lying aversion and social preferences operated in his experiment that the two 
channels were difficult to isolate.  Indeed, Sjaak Hurkens and Navin Kartik (2009, p. 180) 
showed that Gneezy’s (2005) empirical observations were consistent with the “hypothesis 
that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie 
whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling 
the truth.”  Based on this existing evidence, it is, therefore, possible that the world is 
populated, in the spirit of type-based models such as that of Kenneth Koford and Mark 
Penno (1992), by exactly two fixed types: “economic types” and “ethical types” (in 
Gneezy’s terminology).  Alternatively, these two types can, respectively, be characterized 
as consequentialists (who care about consequences to themselves and to others, but not 
about the process by which these consequences are achieved) and as non-consequentialists 
(who care only about the process, but not about consequences).   
The two-type-based model and the model with heterogeneous preferences for 
truthfulness lead to very different implications, particularly for agent selection and 
incentive design.  Therefore, it is important to determine which of these two models offers 
a more accurate description of reality. 
To address this question, we conducted a decision-theoretic laboratory experiment in 
which each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO who had to announce his/her 
firm’s earnings to a passive market.  The participants were informed of the true level of 
earnings.  They were also told that falsely reporting higher earnings was legal and would 
lead to higher actual payoffs than honestly announcing the lower earnings.  We considered 
that economic types would always lie in our experiment because truthfulness was designed 
to be economically costly; we considered that ethical types would always tell the truth.  If, 
by contrast, individuals varied continuously in the extent to which they were driven by 
preferences for truthfulness, they would trade off the economic costs of truthfulness with 
the costs of lying; those with intermediately strong preferences for truthfulness would 
exhibit the most changes in behavior as economic costs changed.   
                                                 
2 A long-standing literature considers the role of preferences that depend on process and/or on consequences 
for others; it recognizes that people do not necessarily maximize utility according to the material 
consequences of their actions.  For example, Matthew Rabin (1995) demonstrated how fairness considerations 
can explain why people are willing to reward or punish others even when this requires a sacrifice of their own 
well-being.  
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The simplicity of our experimental setup--involving a decision-making situation with 
no counterparties--allowed us to isolate motivations for truthtelling that are non-strategic 
and not driven by social preferences; it permitted us to sidestep issues that occur in strategic 
contexts.  Moreover, in our experiment, we observed individuals’ behaviors.  This setup 
enabled us to provide evidence, stronger than that developed in existing works, regarding 
heterogeneity in preferences for truthfulness. 
We observed that, in a situation where the standard economic model predicts that 
everybody will lie, 32% of the participants chose not to do so, thus forgoing a larger 
variable compensation.  Importantly, the aggregate percentage of truthtellers decreased as 
the costs of truthfulness increased.  Our individual-level regressions imply that the marginal 
effect of a cost increase on the probability of an individual’s telling the truth is significantly 
negative, even after controlling for various demographic and psychological factors.  These 
results are at odds with the type-based model but are consistent with a model that posits 
heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness.  
Our primary contribution, therefore, is to provide evidence for the notion that people 
occupy a spectrum of preferences for truthfulness rather than only two opposite positions.  
As a secondary contribution, we examine potential sources of the heterogeneity in 
preferences for truthfulness.  Tendencies towards impression management and self-
deception offer no explanatory power; however, one measure of one source of intrinsic 
costs of lying, an index of “protected values of truthfulness,” seems to organize the data 
well.  We also find substantial evidence of non-separability between this measure of 
intrinsic costs of lying and economic costs of truthfulness in the utility function.  In other 
words, total preferences for truthfulness not only display heterogeneity among, but also 
within, individuals.  We do not have adequate measures of other possible sources of 
intrinsic costs of lying, including, in particular, measures of expressive preferences.  
Therefore, we acknowledge that other preference formulations could potentially explain our 
empirical evidence.   
Section I presents the basic tradeoff and the hypotheses. Section II describes the 
experiment.  Section III discusses the main results.  Section IV explores possible sources of 
intrinsic costs of lying and their interaction with economic costs of truthfulness.  Section V 
concludes.   
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I. The tradeoff 
Consider an agent who decides whether to tell the truth, T=1, or to lie, T=0.  Lying, the 
agent receives a certain income m.  There are Economic Costs Of Stating the Truth, for 
which we use the term ECOST.  The agent receives funds m-ECOST when he tells the truth.  
We model preferences for truthfulness by positing that the agent also experiences total 
costs of lying, iC .  (For the moment, iC  is given.  We discuss in Section IV how these total 
costs of lying may arise from the interplay between the intrinsic costs of lying and the 
extrinsic economic costs of truthfulness.)  If types are continuous, iC  can take on any 
value, positive or negative.  By contrast, in the two-type model, there are only “ethical 
types” who have iC  and “economic types” who have 0iC .  Let the global utility 
function be defined as 
   




0 if                 
1 if     
 
TCbm
TECOSTmb
TV
i
i     (1) 
where T is the choice variable.3  For simplicity, and because wealth effects are unlikely 
in our experiment, we assume the agent has a constant marginal utility of money b>0.  We 
also assume that all participants have the same b.4   
The difference between the utilities of truthtelling and of lying is given by 
bECOSTCY ii * .     
 (2) 
An individual exhibits truthfulness when .0* iY   This implies that truthfulness can, in this 
framework, only arise as optimal behavior if there is a positive total cost of lying.  While 
social preferences are known to contribute to behavior (e.g., Ernst Fehr and Urs 
Fischbacher 2002, 2003), our experiment is designed to eliminate any role for altruism, 
reciprocity, guilt aversion (Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg 2006), and related 
factors, as well as any role for strategic concerns that might arise with repeated interaction.   
                                                 
3 Truthfulness here is a matter of preference.  Alternatively, we could posit a constraint involving a need to 
maintain a minimum level of truth-telling.  Within this simple context, the two formulations are identical.  
Rabin (1995) showed that moral preferences and moral constraints can result in different incentives for 
information collection.   
4 It is standard to assume that, abstracting from the preference feature of interest (for example, inequality 
aversion), all participants have equal marginal utility of money.  See, for example, Ernst Fehr and Klaus 
Schmidt (1999). 
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Consider now a population of individual decision-makers (whose distribution of Ci is 
not known), each of them facing various economic costs of truthfulness.  A type-based 
model, such as that of Koford and Penno (1992), implies that ethical types, with their 
overwhelming preferences for truthfulness, would always choose T=1, and this choice 
would be invariant to ECOST. Conversely, economic types would always lie when 
profitable.  (At ECOST = 0, they would perceive no advantage or disadvantage to either 
telling the truth or lying; but at all other levels of economic costs of truthtelling, the utility 
difference *iY  would be negative.)  Aggregating across the population of individuals, this 
implies the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis TYP (Type-based model): The fraction of the population telling the truth 
remains constant across varying economic costs of truthfulness. 
 
By contrast, in the model based on heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness, where Ci 
varies continuously throughout the population, varying economic costs would lead some 
individuals with intermediate total lying costs to change their behavior.  Higher economic 
costs of truthfulness would then make it less likely that an individual would tell the truth.  
Thus, we have the alternative hypothesis reflecting Gneezy’s conjecture: 
 
Hypothesis HET (Model based on heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness):  
The fraction of the population telling the truth varies with economic costs of truthfulness.   
 
In Section III, we test these two hypotheses using aggregate behavioral data.  We also 
specify an empirical model for individual choice to test the corresponding underlying 
predictions regarding the marginal effect of economic costs of truthfulness on individual 
choice. 
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II. Experimental method5 
We are interested in situations requiring a choice between telling the truth and telling a lie, 
in which the former decision involves an economic sacrifice.  As our context, we chose 
accounting earnings management (henceforth called “earnings management”).6  This 
situation illuminates a real-life conflict: management’s variable compensation is frequently 
tied to stock price performance, which in turn often hinges on earnings announcements.  
We envisioned a framework in which earnings management would be understood to be 
legal (for example, within GAAP rules) although explicitly self-interested and dishonest--a 
decision-making problem focused exclusively on the managerial choice.  We required the 
recipient (the market, played by the computer) to accept passively all financial statements.  
The advantage of this approach is that, due to the absence of strategic interactions, we have 
been able to isolate, at least better than in the real world, factors influencing individuals’ 
choices, without monitoring the participants’ thoughts regarding the behavior of other 
players.7   
 
A. Participants and procedure 
A total of 261 participants (median age: 23 years) took part in this online experiment. We 
recruited participants from undergraduate classes at the University of Zurich (Switzerland). 
50% of the participants were economics and finance students, 40% psychology students, 
and 10% students from other fields.  42% were women and 58% were men (distributed 
                                                 
5 The full set of instructions is available in a Supplementary Appendix.  The experiment included tasks whose 
content and results are not described here for space reasons.  
6 Accounting earnings management occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen 1999).  Accounting earnings management can be 
viewed as a form of lying, which is defined as “a statement that one knows to be false” (Steven L. Grover 
2005). Mark W. Nelson, John A. Elliott, and Robin L. Tarpley (2003) provide many examples collected from 
auditors.   
7 In particular, despite the intuitive appeal and real-world relevance of the strategic games employed in 
Gneezy (2005) and in Hurkens and Kartik (2009), these games come with some interpretational challenges.  
For instance, in sender-receiver games, even telling the truth can be deceptive, because the sender may hope 
that the receiver will not believe the true message that is sent (Matthias Sutter 2009).  Additionally, Julian 
Rode (2010) found that decision makers were significantly less trusting in a competitive context than in a 
cooperative context. 
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across the fields). All participants were told at the outset that anonymity was ensured.8  
They were first asked to respond to a few demographic questions and to read some basic 
instructions.  They were informed that they would individually receive a payment, CHF 8, 
for their completed participation in the study, and an additional payment that depended on 
their decisions.  After having demonstrated their understanding of the (unlabelled) tasks 
and of the rules of the experiment, the participants completed, in randomized orders, the 
three main parts of the experiment: 1) the truthtelling task, 2) the effort task, and 3) the 
measurement of various controls and potential proxies for intrinsic costs of lying. Finally, 
all the participants were paid.  For simplicity, we describe the procedure for one of the 
randomized orders of tasks.   
1) In the truthtelling task, each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO who had to 
announce earnings per share for the previous quarter.  The participants were told that the 
variable component of their salaries would depend on the earnings they announced.  They 
were also told that the market currently anticipated the announcement of 35 cents per share 
as earnings, but that the true earnings were 31 cents per share. The participants were told 
that they could announce earnings of 35 cents per share while remaining within legal 
accounting limits,9 and that the decision would be solely theirs.  They were also informed 
that they would be paid an amount based on the CEO compensation (according to their 
decisions). This additional experimental payoff would be converted into real money at the 
rate of CHF 100,000 = CHF 0.5.  Importantly, participants earned less when choosing to 
tell the truth. 
The participants were then told they would have to announce their financial statements 
that day.  The truthtelling task questionnaire follows: 
 
 
                                                 
8 At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was about US $1 = CHF 1.15.  Most participants received 
payment one week after the experiment. For this purpose, each participant received, before the experiment, a 
code, based on which the experimenter prepared an envelope containing the earnings. Participants received 
the sealed envelopes by indicating their personal codes.  It is, therefore, unlikely that a desire to appear honest 
affected the participants’ behavior systematically.  Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha, and Stephan Meier (2009) 
document how publicly displayed monetary incentives can be less effective in promoting pro-social behavior 
than privately displayed incentives. 
9 Therefore, risk preferences of individuals did not matter, as their choices were not based on the trade-off 
between the expected benefits and costs of committing a crime. 
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Which earnings will you announce?   
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 120,000 (CHF 0.60). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 180,000 (CHF 0.90). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 240,000 (CHF 1.20). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
A few questions served as a manipulation check to verify that participants distinguished 
between the 31 and 35 cent options.  The participants were asked, using a 5-point scale 
ranging from –2 to +2,  the extent to which they judged announcing 31 cents as dishonest 
vs. honest, manipulative vs. not manipulative, short-term-oriented vs. long-term-oriented, 
and associated with personal benefits vs. associated with personal costs.  The same was 
also done for the 35-cent announcement option.  
2) Participants engaged in a simple calculation (effort) task.   
3) We then measured, as potential sources of intrinsic costs of lying (a term we introduce 
formally in Section IV), their tendencies towards impression management and self-
deception, and their levels of protected values.  Moreover, we also measured their altruistic 
concerns.   
 
After the experiment, the participants anonymously received their payments of CHF 8 
plus their earnings.  The average total payment was slightly less than CHF 30.5.10  
                                                 
10 This amount includes payment for other tasks in the full experiment, as described in the Supplementary 
Appendix.   
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B. Variables of interest 
TRUTHFUL CHOICE.  This represented the dependent variable in the truthtelling task, 
coded as a binary variable that took on the value of 1 if a participant chose to announce 
earnings of 31 cents (the honest option), and the value of 0 if a participant announced 35 
cents (the dishonest option).   
ECOST.  This was a within-participants variation.  Economic costs of truthfulness 
derived from the amount of money a participant forfeited by announcing 31 cents.  The 
ECOST variable took on values from CHF 0 to CHF 1.20 (= 1.50 – 0.30), in increments of 
30 cents.   
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT and SELF DECEPTION.  Using the standard 
Deception Scales (PDS) of Delroy Paulhus (1984) in the German version of Jochen Musch, 
Robbi Brockhaus, and Arndt Bröder (2002), we measured individuals’ tendencies to give 
socially desirable responses.  These tendencies come in two distinct forms: a tendency to 
deceive others (impression management) and a tendency to deceive oneself (self-
deception). Both are expected to be positively related to intrinsic costs of lying.  
Accordingly, we coded two variables, EXTDECEIT and SELFDECEIT.  We scaled the 
measures to be between 0 and 1.  Participants who exhibited more socially acceptable 
responses scored higher on both scales.   
PROTECTED VALUES (PV).  The extent to which participants held truthfulness as a 
protected value and, therefore, felt committed to truthtelling was another source of intrinsic 
costs of lying.  To measure this source, we used an index developed by Carmen Tanner, 
Bettina Ryf, and Martin Hanselmann (2009), the details of which are available in the 
Supplementary Appendix.  This index took on a value between 0 (for an individual with no 
protected values) and 6 (for an individual with maximum protected values).  The internal 
consistency of this scale, as assessed by Cronbach’s , was very satisfactory ( = 0.86).11 
ALTRUISTIC CONCERNS.  We asked participants the extent to which they believed 
that announcing 31 cents (or 35 cents) had consequences for other stakeholders (-2 = 
hurting other stakeholders to +2 = not hurting other stakeholders).  Of course, within the 
strict confines of the experiment, there were no such consequences.  Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
11 Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure of the reliability and the internal consistency of an instrument. The measure 
ranges from 0 to 1 and will generally increase when the correlations between the items increase.   
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variable was a relevant control for any altruistic preferences or fairness concerns of the 
participants which might confound our inferences.  Answers to this question were coded as 
the variable 35HURTS.     
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES.  SEX was equal to 1 for female 
participants and to 0 for male participants.  AGE was equal to each participant’s age in 
completed years.  PSYCHOLOGY was equal to 1 for psychology students (“psychologists”) 
and to 0 otherwise.  OTHER was equal to 1 for participants from fields other than 
psychology and economics and to 0 otherwise.  ECONOMICS was the omitted category.  
 
III. Main results 
A. Descriptive evidence 
We first confirm, through a manipulation check, that the participants generally understood 
the announcement of 31 cents to be the honest, non-manipulative action that would lead to 
a personal loss, while the opposite was true of the announcement of 35 cents.  (See Table I.)   
 
TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
 
Table II allows a first look at the choices the participants made in the experiment.  In 
approximately 42% of cases (32% when omitting the free-truth situation), participants 
chose to announce low earnings, that is, chose not to engage in earnings management.  By 
telling the truth, those participants opted to suffer, on average, effective monetary losses of 
11% of the maximum total amount they could have earned in the truthtelling task or 27% of 
the variable amount they could have earned above the guaranteed payout.   
 
TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
 
The fact that a large proportion of the participants reported the truth, even when the 
conditions opposed it, is consistent with the notion that many individuals have positive total 
costs of lying.  By contrast, this finding is inconsistent with the standard economic model.   
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B. Reactions to economic costs of truthfulness 
In this section, our primary goal is to test the implications of the type-based model, which 
posits that the (participant) population consisted only of “economic types” and “ethical 
types,” against the implications of the model based on heterogeneous preferences for 
truthfulness.   
Table II, showing aggregate data, reveals substantial variation in the participants’ 
responses as the economic costs of truthfulness changed:  with higher economic costs, the 
percentage of participants telling the truth was lower.  This is inconsistent with the type-
based model’s prediction in Hypothesis TYP, according to which the fraction of 
participants who told the truth would have remained constant.  Formally, a 2 -test strongly 
rejects the hypothesis that there is a fixed fraction of “ethical” types who always tell the 
truth and a fixed fraction of “economic types” who always lie, with nobody differing from 
these two types.  (This is true not only of the specific version postulated by Hurkens and 
Kartik (2009), where exactly half of the population always tell the truth and the other half 
always lie, but also for any other fraction between 0 and 1.)  When there was no economic 
cost of truthfulness, 18% of the participants still chose the earnings-management solution. 
This can be explained by recognizing that the model based on heterogeneous preferences 
for truthfulness allows agents to have a negative total cost of lying.  (The manipulation 
check confirms that this group of people perceived 35 cents as the less honest option.)  
To investigate statistically the influence of the economic costs of truthfulness on 
individual behavior, we estimate a discrete choice / random utility model (e.g., Gary King 
1998; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 2006).  From Equation (2), adding a stochastic error and 
rearranging terms, each participant i’s (i=1,…261) latent utility difference between 
truthtelling and lying at direct economic ECOSTj  is given by 
.* ijjiij bECOSTCY       (3) 
Under utility maximization, an observed realization of TRUTHFUL CHOICE, ijT , is related 
to *ijY  by the following mechanism: 





.0 if   0
0 if   1
*
*
ij
ij
ij Y
Y
T      (4) 
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In line with standard practice, we assume that   is independent of the explanatory variables 
X .  By assuming that   has the logistic distribution, one obtains the logit model, which is 
the main specification on which we focus.  After relabeling and combining coefficients, 
 jEij ECOSTT   0)1Pr( X ,   (5) 
where    is the logistic cumulative distribution function.12 The coefficient vector is 
estimated by maximum likelihood.  If 0ˆ E , participants react negatively overall to 
economic costs.  The coefficient  ˆ0 here gives the average iC  in the data for zero 
economic costs of truthfulness.  (In Section IV, we explore sources of variation in iC  and 
we discuss that, besides the direct effect of reducing the attractiveness of truthfulness, 
ECOST may have an indirect effect through the total costs of lying.)  The standard errors 
correct for possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering at the individual 
level.  (Recall that participants went through all five economic cost situations.) 
Column (1) of Table III shows the results of this analysis.  Consistent with the fact that 
many individuals did, in fact, tell the truth, the constant term is positive.  Importantly, 
ECOST is a highly significant determinant of the relative attractiveness of truthfulness and 
lying for an individual.  Indeed, the implied marginal effect of ECOST is powerful:  A 30-
cent increase in ECOST was associated with a 16.9% decrease in truthtelling.13  Together 
with the observations made in Table II, this finding supports Hypothesis HET.   
 
TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
 
Column 2 of Table III adds individual-level controls. The main result for ECOST remains 
unchanged.  We observe some interesting additional findings.  First, women appeared to be 
more likely to tell the truth, as did students in fields outside of psychology and economics.  
Second, given the decision-theoretic nature of the experiment, altruistic and distributional 
concerns, as well as attempts to live up to others’ expectations so as to avoid guilt, should 
                                                 
12 If   is normally distributed, one obtains the probit model.  As is typical in econometric applications, the 
two models yield virtually identical inferences. 
13 In the real world, managers are indeed faced with substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in the 
economic cost of truth-telling.  Our results are consistent with findings by Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas 
Philippon (2006), who showed that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings was 
more pronounced at firms where CEO compensation depended more on the stock price.   
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not have affected behavior in this experiment.  Yet, we note that 35HURTS does enter 
significantly in this baseline regression.  This suggests one of two possibilities.  Either 
participants’ altruistic concerns drove behavior, or 35HURTS was correlated with some 
general differences in preferences that were in turn correlated with intrinsic costs of lying 
and thus reflected variation in a variable omitted in Column 2.  As Section IV shows, the 
latter explanation is corroborated by the data.   
 
The conclusions we draw from these main results are simple but important.  Hurkens and 
Kartik (2009) demonstrated that Gneezy’s (2005) data would be consistent with a 
population of pure opportunists, who always lie, and pure ethical types, who always tell the 
truth (as in Koford and Penno 1992).  However, the present evidence of changeability in 
truthtelling behavior and of significant sensitivity to economic costs associated with 
truthfulness rejects Hypothesis TYP and is in direct contrast to the implications of a type-
based model. 
 
IV. Sources of heterogeneity in total costs of lying 
We have established that the participants in our experiment showed more variation in their 
total costs of lying than if they had belonged to one of just two fixed extreme types.  In this 
section, we expand on these findings by considering various potential sources of the 
variation among individuals in total costs of lying.  Moreover, this extension allows us to 
provide further evidence refuting the type-based model; in particular, we document that 
there is also heterogeneity within individuals (across situations) in total costs of lying.    
 
A. Enhanced model 
We consider two constituent sources of heterogeneity in total costs of lying.  First, these 
costs are driven by individuals’ Intrinsic Costs Of Lying, for which we use the term ICOLi.  
Second, we also allow the situation, that is, the economic costs of truthfulness or the 
extrinsic incentives for lying, ECOSTj, to influence the total costs of lying.  Adjusting 
notation, we posit that total costs of lying may vary both among and within individuals, and 
we now write  jiijij ECOSTICOLCC , . Since all participants encountered the same 
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ECOST situations, the evidence on heterogeneous total costs of lying provided in Section 
III necessarily implies that there is heterogeneity in ICOLi.  Next, the intrinsic costs of lying 
and the economic incentives for lying (economic costs of truthfulness) may enter ijC  
separably or non-separably.  Indeed, whether intrinsic preferences and extrinsic incentives 
interact in determining total preferences for a certain action has implications that extend 
beyond the scope of the current study; see, for example, Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía 
Reyes (2011) for a discussion of how incentives to contribute to public goods may affect 
social preferences.  In order to capture both possibilities, we consider, for parsimony, a 
simple parametric specification 
  jijijiij ECOSTICOLECOSTICOLECOSTICOLC 3210,   ,  (6) 
implying 
  ijjiji
ijjiij
ECOSTICOLECOSTbICOL
bECOSTCY




3210
*
  (7) 
and, with the maintained distributional assumptions, 
 jiIEjEiIij ECOSTICOLECOSTICOLT   0)1Pr( X , 
 (8) 
where  ˆ and ,ˆ ,ˆ ,ˆ0 IEEI  are the implied estimates for the model parameters 
  3210  and , , ,  b , respectively.   
 
B. Interpreting the model coefficient estimates 
Naturally, ijC is expected to be increasing in iICOL , so that we predict 0ˆ I .  This 
coefficient thus allows us to test whether a candidate measure of ICOL helps explain 
heterogeneity among individuals in total costs of lying.  Moreover, specification (6) allows 
for two channels through which heterogeneity in total preferences for truthfulness within 
individuals enters.  First, it seems reasonable to postulate that ijC is increasing in ECOST so 
that individuals associate higher monetary stakes with a stronger preference to tell the truth.  
Given that the parameters b and 2  are not identified by the present approach,  0ˆ E  
only tells us that ijC  is not increasing in ECOST at a rate greater than marginal utility b.  
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Second, heterogeneity of preferences within individuals for truthfulness can unambiguously 
be detected by considering the interaction term IE .  Under the discrete-choice model’s 
assumptions, a significant interaction term provides further evidence against the notion, 
posited by the type-based model, that there are two fixed types.14  Specifically, a positive 
interaction term arises if the intrinsic costs of lying are more important in determining total 
preferences for truthfulness when the stakes (ECOST) are higher.  An equivalent 
interpretation (useful in settings where an agent can choose the size of the lie) is that 
individuals with stronger intrinsic costs of lying perceive “larger” lies, which yield larger 
economic benefits, as less attractive and will, thus, tell “smaller” lies.  A negative 
interaction term instead arises if the source of the intrinsic costs of lying is relatively less 
influential at higher stakes.  If the coefficient on the interaction is zero, the economic costs 
of truthtelling are perceived identically by all agents, regardless of the strength of their 
intrinsic costs of lying, ICOLi.  In that case, all agents’ utilities would react identically to 
changes in the economic costs, even though heterogeneous iICOL  would imply that some 
would report the truth while others would lie at a given ECOST.15  
                                                 
14 Alternatively, if the true utility function has a separable form but the assumption of weak exogeneity of the 
error term ij  does not hold, then the interaction term in the model may serve as an instrument to correct for 
correlation between the explanatory variables (ICOLi and ECOSTj) and the error term ij . The interaction 
term can serve as an instrument because it arises as one of the terms in the second-order Taylor-series 
expansion of the random utility function (with violated weak exogeneity).  It captures jointly the effects of 
both explanatory variables.  One anonymous Referee provided an example in which 90% of individuals make 
deterministic decisions based on an additively separable utility function, i.e., they tell the truth when 
Ci=ICOLi is greater than ECOST, and they lie when ICOLi is smaller than ECOST. 10% of individuals make 
decision errors; that is, they tell the truth although ECOST is greater than ICOLi, and they lie even when 
ICOLi is greater than ECOST.  In simulated data, the Referee showed that a logit regression (which is a 
misspecified model under the assumptions made) may yield a significant interaction term on ECOST and 
intrinsic costs of lying, even in this setting.  In the Referee’s example, the error term is not independent of the 
observable variables.  Thus, the interaction term becomes significant in this setting because it is an 
instrumental variable for an omitted variable.  We conclude that, even if the true utility function is separable, 
researchers may well want to use a non-separable reduced form because this specification is robust to the 
violation of the assumption of weak exogeneity of the error term, such as occurs in decision errors of the form 
proposed by the Referee.   
15 When testing for non-separability (that is, for the significance of the interaction term), we consider 
coefficients, rather than marginal effects, from the logit regressions.  Recall that marginal effects in a logit 
regression are given by     βXβ'Xβ'  1 , where    is the logistic cumulative distribution 
function giving the initial probability of truthfulness.  Those with high (low) ICOL have high (low) initial 
probabilities of truthfulness.  Thus, the highest marginal effects of ECOST on behavior are likely to be found 
in the middle range, and smaller marginal effects are likely to be found among those with high intrinsic costs.  
Analyzing coefficients instead allows us to consider the hypothetical case of participants who would display 
identical initial probabilities of reporting the truth.   
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C. Results 
We first consider three possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying, ICOLi, for which survey 
measures are available to us, and we then discuss other possible drivers of behavior.  The 
descriptive statistics for EXTDECEIT, SELFDECEIT, and PV shown in Table IV indicate 
that there is wide variation in these three variables, suggesting that they could potentially 
explain the observed variation in truthtelling behavior.  In Table III, we test whether this is 
the case.  We allow each possible source to affect behavior both separably from economic 
costs and jointly by way of an interaction.   
 
TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
 
First, participants may have developed an interest in impressing the experimenter by 
appearing honest and non-greedy (e.g. Urs Fischbacher and Franziska Heusi 2008); this 
would act like a preference for truthfulness.  Given the design of the experiment, in which 
we took great care to make the responses anonymous, this is very unlikely to have 
occurred.  Indeed, EXTDECEIT is not significant in any of the regressions, and neither is 
the interaction term with ECOST.  
Second, it is possible that participants deceived or impressed themselves by making the 
“right” choices.  However, SELFDECEIT is also not significant in any of the regressions, 
and neither is the interaction term with ECOST.   
Third, we consider the possibility that moral values were a source of the intrinsic costs 
of lying.  While many moral concepts are potentially relevant, we focus on protected values 
(PV).  The literature that has developed the theory of these values emphasizes that protected 
values are non-consequentialist and induce a resistance to engaging in actions that would 
violate moral values, reducing the attractiveness of any financial gains obtained through 
such actions.16  That is, the economic costs of truthfulness matter less to those who hold 
stronger protected values of truthfulness; those people are trade-off resistant.  This idea 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca (1997); Philip E. Tetlock, Orie V. Kristel, S. Beth 
Elson, Melanie C. Green, and Jennifer S. Lerner (2000); and Carmen Tanner, Douglas L. Medin, and Rumen 
Iliev (2008).  The source of protected values is modeled by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2011) as a need 
of agents to invest in their identity.  For the strongest form of PV, “sacred” values and taboos, see in particular 
section V of their paper. 
 18
naturally translates into a functional form for iC  that is non-separable into intrinsic (moral) 
costs of lying and economic costs of truthfulness. 
Column (3) of Table III shows that PV of truthfulness was a highly significant predictor 
of behavior in the experiment.  A one-point increase in PV was associated with a 17.4% 
increase in the probability of truthtelling, holding the other variables at their means.  In 
Column (4), we obtain a positive, significant coefficient on the interaction term between PV 
and ECOST.  This is evidence that, conditional on the correctness of the discrete choice 
(logit) model’s specification, the data are consistent with non-separability of the economic 
incentives and this measure of intrinsic costs of lying.  That is, the data confirm that there is 
heterogeneity within individuals’ total costs of lying, again inconsistent with the type-based 
model’s assumption.   
Note that iIEE PV ˆˆ   is negative even when evaluated at PV = 6.  Thus, in the cross-
section of participants, the presence of a strong protected value of truthfulness lessened, but 
did not eliminate, the relevance of the economic costs associated with the earnings 
management decision.  With PV in the regression, the significance of the demographic 
controls vanishes.  It is also noteworthy that, as soon as we include the interaction term 
with PV, 35HURTS is no longer significant.17  Finally, as shown in Column (5), we also 
find that our results continue to hold in the subsample without the free-truth situation.   
We emphasize that, despite these findings, one cannot conclude that PV has a stronger 
claim to organizing the data than plausible alternatives.  For example, participants may be 
driven by non-consequentialist preferences that attach expressive utility to low-stakes acts 
or decisions that substantiate or confirm personal identity.  This expressive-preferences 
concept was developed in the political science literature to explain why citizens vote 
despite an apparent lack of economic incentive (James M. Buchanan 1954; Gordon Tullock 
1971).  Expressive preferences have been experimentally documented to play a role in 
hypothetical choice situations, for example, by Timothy Feddersen, Sean Gailmard, and 
Alvaro Sandroni (2009).  While, in the formulation of these authors, expressive preferences 
                                                 
17 This is as expected, given the setup of this experiment, and it suggests that the significance of 35HURTS in 
the earlier regressions stems from the fact that this variable (as well as the underlying social-preferences 
intensity of the individual) is correlated with intrinsic costs of lying.  35HURTS has a positive correlation with 
PV of 0.34.  Within our experimental setup, we are unable to address any possible fundamental relationship 
between protected values and altruistic concerns, so we leave this to future research. 
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(EP) enter utility separably from economic costs, it is conceivable that EP also interact with 
incentives so that non-separability arises.  To the extent that the PV survey implicitly 
measures EP, and conditional on the correctness of the statistical model’s specification, the 
results on the interaction term imply that EP may, in the range of economic stakes 
considered in this experiment, become more important in creating a difference in the 
perceived attractiveness of truthfulness and lying as the stakes increase.18  Overall, the 
evidence available from this experiment does not allow us to discriminate definitively 
between EP and PV as possible sources of heterogeneity in agents’ lying behaviors.  
Additional factors relevant in the real world are also not addressed here.  For example, 
intrinsic costs of lying may also be due to an internal reward mechanism for truthfulness 
that is activated when individuals are, for example, asked to recall the Ten Commandments 
or to sign an honor code (e.g. Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely 2008).   
 
D. Further results and robustness 
Conceivably, participants may have worried about the wealth of the experimenters, 
which would show up in systematic variation in their choices in the effort task.  But, there 
is no observable relationship between the participants’ levels of effort in that task and their 
PV, 35HURTS, or socially acceptable responding.  This finding also confirms that the 
experimental design did not simply produce the same pattern of results in the truthtelling 
and the effort tasks.  Moreover, our results are robust to controlling for investment 
experience, and to variations in samples and estimation methods.  All these additional 
results are available upon request.   
 
V. Conclusion 
In this study, we examined individuals who were exposed to a simple, but realistic 
trade-off: they could tell the truth and suffer economic costs of truthfulness, or they could 
lie and potentially incur intrinsic costs of lying.  In our setting, there was no strategic 
                                                 
18 Conceptually, EP may also be related to tendencies towards self-deception, though the previous results 
suggest that a standard measure of such tendencies does not explain behavior in this experiment.   
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incentive to tell the truth; the participants had no counterparty, no notion of a repeated 
game, no legal obligation, and no risk of being punished.   
The experimental results unambiguously reject a type-based model.  That is, the results 
refute Hypothesis TYP, that there exist only “the Ethical” (who care so much about the 
rightfulness of the process that they always tell the truth) and “the Economic” (who care 
only about their material payoffs and thus always lie when profitable).  Instead, this paper 
supports Hypothesis HET, reflecting Gneezy’s (2005) conjecture of continuous 
heterogeneity of preferences for truthfulness:  People balance process against consequences 
in a range of different ways.  Moreover, we provide evidence that preferences for 
truthfulness are non-separable in intrinsic preferences and economic incentives.  In sum, 
our findings point to heterogeneity, both among and within individuals, in their preferences 
for truthfulness.  
This experiment cannot definitively identify the ultimate source(s) of the intrinsic costs 
of lying.  Nor can it state whether the suggested preferences for truthfulness would also be 
at work at much higher stakes (as the protected-values explanation implies) or whether the 
validity of the results is limited to relatively low-stakes settings (as the expressive-
preferences explanation suggests).  Future research may be fruitfully conducted to answer 
these important questions.  
To the extent that preferences for truthfulness apply in a wide range of settings, the 
results obtained in this study have implications regarding the effectiveness of methods to 
screen agents for their preferences for truthfulness, as well as implications for the optimal 
setting of incentive contracts.  
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TABLES 
Table I: Manipulation checks 
Participants answered questions that asked for their assessments of announcing 31 and 35 
cents, respectively.  These questions were on a -2 to +2 scale.  After reordering (the 
direction of the scale varies between questions), a value of +2 indicates that the action was 
seen as honest, non-manipulative, associated with a personal financial loss, and based on a 
long-term view.   
 
31 cents 35 cents t-test
Honest vs. Dishonest 1.61 -1.17 26.47
Non-manipulative vs. Manipulative 1.39 -1.14 22.70
Personal financial loss vs. Personal financial gain 0.93 -1.25 19.50
Long-term view vs. Short-term view 0.99 -1.1 18.53  
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Table II: Behavior across economic costs of truthfulness 
This table presents the percentages of participants announcing 31 cents of earnings per 
share across the various economic cost of stating the truth (ECOST) conditions.   
 
ECOST  = 
CHF 0
ECOST  = 
CHF 0.3
ECOST  = 
CHF 0.6
ECOST  = 
CHF 0.9
ECOST  = 
CHF 1.2 Total
Total except 
ECOST  = 0
82.0% 52.1% 31.4% 23.0% 21.1% 41.9% 31.9%
Percent of participants announcing 31 cents
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Table III: Determinants of earnings management behavior 
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions.  The dependent variable is TRUTHFUL 
CHOICE.  The explanatory variables are described in the text.  Columns (1) to (4) use data 
from all ECOST situations.  Column (5) omits the free truth (ECOST = CHF 0) situation.  
Robust standard errors, obtained by clustering at the individual level, appear in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic cost of no earnings management (ECOST) -2.35*** -2.50*** -2.75*** -6.10*** -5.22***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (1.38) (1.43)
Sex (1: Female, 0: Male) 0.46* 0.30 0.30 0.39
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30)
Age (Years) -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Psychology (1: Yes, 0: No) 0.25 0.03 0.05 -0.13
(0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
Other studies (1: Yes, 0: No) 0.66* 0.24 0.27 0.07
(0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44)
Altruistic concerns (35HURTS) 0.41*** 0.22** 0.12 -0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Impression management tendency (EXTDECEIT) 0.50 -0.07 0.66
(0.97) (0.87) (1.13)
Self deception tendency (SELFDECEIT) 0.02 0.08 -1.07
(1.03) (0.97) (1.25)
Protected values (PV) 0.73*** 0.36*** 0.45**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19)
35HURTS * ECOST 0.18 0.35
(0.21) (0.24)
EXTDECEIT * ECOST 1.18 0.14
(1.59) (1.61)
SELFDECEIT  * ECOST -0.66 0.79
(1.74) (1.78)
PV * ECOST 0.75*** 0.57**
(0.22) (0.25)
Constant 1.00*** 0.88 -1.56 0.16 -0.61
(0.11) (0.66) (1.16) (1.11) (1.26)
Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,044
Number of participants 261 261 261 261 261
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.19
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -757.6 -719.7 -667.4 -655.7 -531.8
Likelihood-ratio test statistic (χ2, p-value) 259.6 (<0.01) 335.4 (<0.01) 440.0 (<0.01) 463.4 (<0.01) 243.6 (<0.01)
Wald test statistic (χ2, p-value) 183.9 (<0.01) 211.0 (<0.01) 222.8 (<0.01) 204.8 (<0.01) 107.1 (<0.01)  
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Table IV: Descriptive statistics of important explanatory variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our measure of altruistic concerns and for three 
candidate measures of intrinsic costs of lying.  N = 261. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Altruistic concerns (35HURTS) 0.74 1.00 1.07 -2.00 2.00
Tendency towards impression management (EXTDECEIT) 0.49 0.50 0.13 0.16 0.81
Tendency towards self deception (SELFDECEIT) 0.64 0.63 0.12 0.24 1.00
Protected values (PV) 3.82 3.78 1.03 0.00 6.00  
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Supplementary Appendix 
 
A. 1 Full description of the experiment 
PARTICIPANTS  
A total of 261 subjects (median age: 23 years) participated in this online experiment. We 
recruited participants from undergraduate classes at the University of Zurich (Switzerland). 
50% of the participants were economics and finance students, 40% psychology students, 
and 10% students from other fields.  42% were women and 58% were men (distributed 
across the fields). Participants received a fixed amount as payment for their participation 
and an additional variable amount as compensation determined by their choices. 
Anonymity was ensured.19  
 
PROCEDURE 
All participants were first assured of anonymity throughout the experiment, then asked to 
respond to a few demographic questions and to read some basic instructions.  They were 
informed that they would individually receive a payment, CHF 8, for their completed 
participation in the study, and an additional payment that depended on their choices.20 The 
participants then completed the main parts of the experiment: 1) the truthtelling task, 2) the 
effort task, and 3) the measurement of protected values. (These tasks were not labelled for 
the participants.)  The experiment ended with some final questions serving mainly as 
control variables; then all the participants were paid.  For simplicity, we describe the 
procedure for only one of the randomized orders of tasks.  For both the truthtelling and the 
effort tasks, participants first were required to demonstrate their understanding of the tasks 
and of the rules of the experiment. 
 
1) TRUTHTELLING TASK.  The truthtelling task consisted of two phases, each involving 
five choices. Specifically, the task consisted of the following steps: choices in Phase 1, a 
norm manipulation, choices in Phase 2, and a manipulation check. 
Phase 1: In the truthtelling task, each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO 
who had to announce earnings per share for the previous quarter.  The participants were 
told that the variable component of their salaries depended on the earnings they announced.  
They were also told that the market currently anticipated the announcement of 35 cents per 
share as earnings,21 but that the true earnings were 31 cents per share. The participants were 
told that they could announce earnings of 35 cents per share while remaining within legal 
                                                 
19 Most participants received payment one week after the experiment. For this purpose, each participant had 
received, before the experiment, a code, based on which the experimenter prepared an envelope containing 
the earnings. Participants received the sealed envelopes by indicating their personal codes.  
20 At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was about US $1 = CHF 1.15.  
21 The actual term for the equivalent of cents in the Swiss currency is “Rappen,” and the experiment used the 
precise Swiss terminology, that is, a choice between 31 Rappen and 35 Rappen, where 100 Rappen = CHF 1. 
For simplicity, we refer to “cents” within the text. 
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accounting limits,22 and that the decision would be solely theirs.  They were also informed 
that they would be paid an amount based on the CEO compensation (according to their 
choices). This additional experimental payoff was converted into real money at the rate of 
CHF 100,000 = CHF 0.5.  Importantly, participants earned less when choosing to tell the 
truth. 
The participants were then told to submit their financial statements that day.  
Specifically, they were provided, in a randomized manner, with one of two orders of the 
following choice tasks: 
Which earnings will you announce?   
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 120,000 (CHF 0.60). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 180,000 (CHF 0.90). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 240,000 (CHF 1.20). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
__ 31 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
__ 35 cents per share -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
Norm manipulation: After Phase 1, participants were given a page to read stating that 
there was a good opportunity for the acquisition of another company the following year, for 
which they would need the shareholders’ approval. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three groups: control, positive social norm, or negative social norm. While the 
control group was given no further information, the positive (negative) social norm group 
received a social norms manipulation (Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. 
Kallgren (1990)).  It read thus: “One evening, you are sitting with a friend of yours who is a 
financial analyst.  He tells you that increasing reported earnings in order to meet market 
expectations meets with widespread approval (disapproval).” 
Phase 2: After this interlude, all the participants were again provided with the same set 
of five options as in Phase 1, requiring them to announce earnings of either 31 or 35 cents 
per share.  
Overall, the participants could earn between CHF 9 and CHF 15 in the two phases of 
the truthtelling task.  The participants earned the maximum payment when they engaged in 
earnings management in both choice situations.  
Manipulation check: As our manipulation check, the participants were provided with 
four items and asked, using a 5-point scale ranging from –2 to +2,  the extent to which they 
judged announcing 31 cents as dishonest vs. honest, manipulative vs. not manipulative, and 
short-term-oriented vs. long-term-oriented. The same was also done for the 35-cent option. 
To verify that participants correctly perceived their options, we also asked participants the 
extent to which they associated announcing 31 cents (or 35 cents) with personal costs or 
                                                 
22 Therefore, risk preferences of individuals did not matter as their choices were not based on the trade-off 
between the expected benefits and costs of committing a crime. 
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personal benefits (-2 = associated with personal costs to +2 = associated with personal 
benefits).  
 
2) EFFORT TASK. Participants engaged in a simple calculation task, testing the prediction 
that protected values of truthfulness would play no role in tasks without an 
honesty/dishonesty dimension.  This also allowed us to examine somewhat the possibility 
that participants’ choices were affected by concerns regarding the experimenter’s wealth or 
by aspects of the experiment’s design (for example, the order of choices).  In this task, all 
participants were given the role of a manager who could affect the firm’s value and their 
own remuneration by the amount and the accuracy of the work that they did.  Participants 
were then provided with the following slide:  
In this task, you can increase earnings per share and, therefore, your compensation, by working.  
You will work on five sets of calculations.  In each set, you can decide whether to do 1 or 5 simple 
calculations.  Doing 5 calculations takes approximately five times as long as doing 1 calculation, 
and you will be paid more for this.  The compensation you receive for 1 and for 5 calculations will 
vary over the five sets of calculations.  Moreover, you will receive CHF 0.2 for each correct 
calculation.   
Participants were shown an example of a calculation, such as 3 + 4 – 5 + 8 + 3 – 9 = ?  The 
participants then read the following screen, one set of choices at a time:   
How many calculations do you wish to do?   
__ 1 calculation -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30). 
__ 5 calculations -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
 
…. [Three analogous choice situations offering, for 1 calculation, CHF 120,000 (CHF 0.60), CHF 
180,000 (CHF 0.90), and CHF 240,000 (CHF 1.20), respectively, are omitted for space reasons.] 
 
__ 1 calculation -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
__ 5 calculations -- In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). 
On this task, participants could earn between CHF 4.50 (for always choosing one 
calculation, done incorrectly) and CHF 12.50 (for always choosing five calculations, done 
correctly).   
  
3) MEASUREMENT OF PROTECTED VALUES.  According to the correspondence (or 
compatibility) principle established by Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein (1980), values and 
behavior need to be assessed at a similar level of specificity in order to be able to uncover a 
link between the two.  This principle underlies the measure developed by Carmen Tanner, 
Bettina Ryf, and Martin Hanselmann (2009), which we used to assess the extent to which 
participants held truthfulness as a protected value and, therefore, felt committed to 
truthtelling.  Since we are studying earnings management behaviors, we adapted the 
introduction of their questionnaire to the present context.  The questionnaire (see Section II 
of the Appendix) contains two highly correlated subscales designed to approach protected 
values from different angles.  Five items assessed the participants’ reactions to violations of 
honesty by a hypothetical CEO reporting company information.  This represents an indirect 
approach because the decisions of others were being evaluated.  Four additional items 
assessed the participants’ own protected values more directly by examining how much 
importance they attributed to specific features of protected values (such as trade-off 
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reluctance, unwillingness to sacrifice a value, or incommensurability), again referring to the 
specific context of a hypothetical CEO’s decisions regarding the reporting of information.   
 
The participants also had to answer another set of questions, which served as control 
variables. After the experiment, the participants anonymously received their payments of 
CHF 8 plus their earnings.  The average total payment was slightly less than CHF 30.5.23  
 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
TRUTHFUL CHOICE. This represented the dependent variable in the truthtelling task, 
coded as a binary variable that took on the value of 1 if a participant chose to announce 
earnings of 31 cents (the honest option), and the value of 0 if a participant announced 35 
cents (the dishonest option).   
 
EFFORT CHOICE.  This represented the dependent variable in the effort task.  It took on 
the value of 1 if a participant chose to do five calculations (high effort), and the value of 0 
if a participant chose to do one calculation (low effort).   
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
ECOST.  This was a within-participants variation.  Costs of truthfulness derived from the 
amount of money a participant forfeited by announcing 31 cents (that is, by truthfulness).  
The ECOST variable took on values from CHF 0 to CHF 1.20 (= 1.50 – 0.30), in 
increments of 30 cents.   
 
SOCIAL NORM.  This was a between-participants variation.  We defined three dummies, 
making Phase 1 the omitted category in the regressions.  CONTROL was equal to 1 for all 
observations from Phase 2 with no additional information, and to 0 otherwise.  POSITIVE 
NORM was equal to 1 for all observations from Phase 2 with the positive social norm 
(approval of earnings management), and to 0 otherwise.  NEGATIVE NORM was equal to 1 
for all observations from Phase 2 with the negative social norm (disapproval of earnings 
management), and to 0 otherwise.   
 
PROTECTED VALUES (PV).  After appropriate recoding of some items, an index of the 
degree of protected values (PV) was constructed, based on the means across the four direct 
and the five indirect items. This index took on a value between 0 (for an individual with no 
protected values) and 6 (for an individual with maximum protected values).  The internal 
consistency of this scale, as assessed by Cronbach’s , was very satisfactory ( = 0.86).24 
                                                 
23 As explained earlier, by using codes to distribute earnings, we took as much care as possible to ensure 
anonymity.  That is, we tried to remove any possible grounds for expecting reciprocity.  It is, therefore, 
unlikely that a desire to appear honest affected the participants’ behavior systematically.  See Dan Ariely, 
Anat Bracha, and Stephan Meier (2009) for a study of how publicly displayed monetary incentives can be less 
effective in promoting pro-social behavior than privately displayed incentives.   
24 Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure of the reliability and the internal consistency of an instrument. The measure 
ranges from 0 to 1 and will generally increase when the correlations between the items increase.  We also did 
the analysis using the direct and indirect subscales separately, with similar results.  
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CONTROL VARIABLES 
ALTRUISTIC CONCERNS. We asked participants the extent to which they believed that 
announcing 31 cents (or 35 cents) had consequences for other stakeholders (-2 = hurting 
other stakeholders to +2 = not hurting other stakeholders).  Of course, within the strict 
confines of the experiment, there were no such consequences.  Nonetheless, this variable 
was a potentially relevant control for altruistic preferences or fairness concerns that 
participants might have and that might confound our inferences regarding protected values 
of truthfulness.  Answers to this question were coded as the variable 35HURTS.     
 
SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE RESPONDING. We used the standard Deception Scales (PDS) 
of Delroy Paulhus (1984); see Jochen Musch, Robbi Brockhaus, and Arndt Bröder (2002) 
for the German version.  This questionnaire measured individuals’ tendencies to give 
socially desirable responses (SDR), in two distinct forms: self-deception and impression 
management.  Accordingly, we coded two variables SELFDECEIT and EXTDECEIT.  
Participants who exhibited more socially acceptable responses scored higher on both scales.   
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES. SEX, AGE, and STUDIES served as control 
variables. SEX was equal to 1 for female participants and to 0 for male participants.  AGE 
was equal to each participant’s age in completed years.  PSYCHOLOGY was equal to 1 for 
psychology students (“psychologists”) and to 0 otherwise.  OTHER was equal to 1 for 
participants from fields other than psychology and economics and to 0 otherwise.  
ECONOMICS was the omitted category.  
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A. 2 Protected Values survey 
According to the correspondence (or compatibility) principle established by Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980), values and behavior need to be assessed at a similar level of specificity in 
order to be able to uncover a link between the two.  This principle underlies the measure 
developed by Tanner, Ryf, and Hanselmann (2009).   
 
Since we are studying earnings management behaviors, we adapted the introduction of their 
questionnaire to the present context.  The questionnaire, contains two highly correlated 
subscales designed to approach protected values from different angles.   
 
Five items assessed the participants’ reactions to violations of honesty by a hypothetical 
CEO reporting company information.  This represents an indirect approach because the 
decisions of others were being evaluated.   
 
Four additional items assessed the participants’ own protected values more directly by 
examining how much importance they attributed to specific features of protected values 
(such as trade-off reluctance, unwillingness to sacrifice a value, or incommensurability), 
again referring to the specific context of a hypothetical CEO’s decisions regarding the 
reporting of information.   
 
After appropriate recoding of some items, an index of the degree of protected values (PV) 
was constructed, based on the means across the four direct and the five indirect items. 
 
Note: The original Protected Values survey was conducted in German.  In the paper, for 
ease of interpretation of the empirical results, we changed the scale to range from 0 to 6.  
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Because CEOs’ compensation levels depend on the earnings they report to their 
shareholders, CEOs have an incentive to modify reports to shareholders.  What is your 
opinion on CEOs modifying company information in reports?  
 
Please choose the appropriate category.  This is: 
 
Very immoral   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very moral 
Not at all praiseworthy     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very praiseworthy 
Not at all blameworthy   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   very blameworthy  
Not at all outrageous       1   2   3   4   5   6   7     very outrageous  
Not at all acceptable       1   2   3   4   5   6   7     very acceptable 
 
CEOs have an opportunity to modify information in the reports they provide to their 
shareholders.  Some view such modification as a violation of truthfulness, others regard it 
as acceptable protection of personal interests.  What do you think about the value of 
truthfulness in such a situation?  
 
Truthfulness is something  
 
… that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  strongly agree 
… for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  strongly agree 
… that cannot be measured in monetary terms. 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  strongly agree 
… about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  strongly agree 
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A. 3 Additional results 
A. Distribution of PV 
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Figure S-1: This figure plots the kernel density (using an Epanechnikov kernel) of the 
strength of protected values of the participants who chose to manage earnings (broken line) 
and for those participants who willingly bore economic costs for not managing earnings 
(solid line).  The figure is plotted for the median cost level in Phase 1.  Protected Values 
(PV) is the average of all nine items of the survey described in the text.  Higher numbers 
correspond to stronger protected values.   
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B. Quantitative implications for preference parameters 
In the main text, we found that PV serves as a useful measure to organize the data.  Here, 
we provide a quantitative interpretation of the findings for PV.  (The other candidate 
measures for intrinsic costs of lying were insignificant.)  For PV, a useful way to interpret 
the results quantitatively is offered by slightly rewriting the preference specification in 
equation (1).  Let          TTkbECOSTECOSTmbPVTV iiii  111   . The 
difference between the utilities of truthtelling and of lying is here given by  iii kbECOSTY  1*  .    
 (A1) 
In this formulation, the role of intrinsic costs of lying is split up even more explicitly than 
in the formulation in the main paper, although they are mathematically isomorphic.  Here, 
first, protected values generate moral costs of lying   iiPV   .  A second role of protected 
values is that the actual marginal utility an agent ascribes to monies depends on the process 
by which the funds were obtained and on the agent’s moral evaluation of that process.  In 
the present context, a dollar obtained by an act of lying may be regarded as less valuable 
than a dollar obtained by telling the truth.  This is reflected in a preference parameter   ii kPVk  .  An agent discounts funds obtained by lying if ik  is positive.  
We posit for parsimony the simple linear parametric specifications ii PV10    and 
ii PVk 10   .  Adding a stochastic error and rearranging terms, each participant 
i’s(i=1,…261) latent utility difference between truthtelling and lying at direct economic 
ECOSTj  is then given by  
  .1
1
1010
*
ijjiji
ijijiij
ECOSTbPVbECOSTPV
kbECOSTY



 
 
 (A2) 
Thus, under the maintained distributional assumptions, after relabeling and combining 
coefficients,  jiPVECOSTjECOSTiPVij ECOSTPVECOSTPVT   0)1Pr( X ,
 (A3) 
where    is the logistic cumulative distribution function.  For the model estimated in 
Column (1) of Table III of the paper, we therefore have iPVi PV ˆˆˆ 0   and   bPVk iPVECOSTECOSTi /1ˆˆ1ˆ   .  For ki, the parameters 0  and 1  are not identified, 
because b is unknown.  One way to make progress is to determine (speculatively) ki at some 
PV level.  As a perhaps reasonable benchmark, assume that k is zero for an individual with 
an average PV level (3.82).  From this, we can infer the implied b = 2.91.  (Recall that we 
are assuming that b is independent of protected values.)  This in turn then allows us to plug 
in a range of PV levels to obtain the implied lying discounts (or premia).  (Another 
approach is to simply posit values for b and calculate ki accordingly.)   
Table S-I shows the results of these calculations.  95% confidence intervals are shown in 
brackets below the point estimates.  For the moral cost of lying, i , the estimates suggest 
an average value of around unity.  If the average participant is indifferent to the process by 
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which funds are obtained, our estimate of b is 2.91.  For the discount parameter, ki, our 
experiment then implies that an individual with a protected value in the 75th percentile will 
discount funds acquired dishonestly by about 21%, with even the lower bound of the 95% 
confidence interval being about 8%.  Thus, the trade-off resistance implied by protected 
values is not only a statistically, but also an economically, significant factor in decision 
making.25  Of course, assuming that the average ki is zero implies that an economic model 
using the proposed preference specification becomes interesting mostly when there is 
variation in protected values across agents. 
 
Table S-I: Quantitative implications for preference parameters 
 
Average PV
PV at 25th 
percentile
PV at 75th 
percentile PV=6
li 1.15 0.79 1.46 2.09
[0.93; 1.37] [0.52; 1.07] [1.18; 1.75] [1.54; 2.64]
k i 0 -0.23 0.21 0.63
n.a. [-0.41; -0.04] [0.08; 0.35] [0.36; 0.89]  
 
                                                 
25 Note that factors reflected neither in the model nor in the experiment may shift the attractiveness of 
truthfulness.  For example, an anticipated loss of reputation in case of cheating may make lying less attractive 
at a given cost of truthfulness, thus adding to the personal moral cost of lying.  These external factors would, 
therefore, complement and enhance the power of the discount factor ki.   
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